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BOOK REVIEWS
REVIEW ARTICLES
DETERRENCE: ISSUES AND METHODOLOGIES IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE
IMPACT OF LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL*
CHARLES F. WELLFORD**
In recent years renewed and increased attention
has been given by social scientists to the analysis
of the criminal justice system. During this period
the study of law has developed from a caseoriented, philosophical perspective to an empirical
concern with the interrelationship between law
and society. A central issue in the emergence of
the empirical analysis of law has been the consideration of the impact that the enactment of the
criminal law has on the incidence and distribution
of the behaviors it proscribes. In short, the concept
of deterrence has provided the theoretical basis
for a variety of approaches to the empirical analysis
of the "Jaw in action." Throughout this recent
period, the emerging work of Zimring and Hawkins
has been eagerly anticipated. Their analysis of
marginal deterrence in 1968,1 Zimring's summary
pamphlet in 1971,2 and their involvement in
numerous other related activities established their
central position in the consideration of deterrence
as a viable theoretical and empirical concept. The
current book represents their effort to integrate
and interpret the variety of work that contributes
to our understanding of deterrence.
In the review that follows I will attempt to
convey the central elements from Zimring and
Hawkins exegesis of the deterrence literature;
relate their analysis to other recent summary
statements; critically analyze what I consider to
be the most problematic portions of their work;
and consider the implications of our current under* A review article of DETERRENCE: TE LEGAL
CONTROL. By Franklin E. Zimring
THREAT 3N CRI

and GordonJ. Hawkins. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1973. Pp. xiv, 376. $13.50.
** Associate Professor, School of Criminology,
Florida State University.
IZimring & Hawkins, Deterrence and Marginal
Groups, 5J. RES. Cans. &DELINQUENCY 100 (1968).
2F. ZmIING, PERsPE TwES INDETERRENCE (1971).
'F. ZnmG & G. HAWKiNS, DETERRENCE: THE
LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).

standings of deterrence for future research and
public policy.
The analysis of deterrence by Zimring and
Hawkins is divided into five major issues: 1) the
rationale of deterrence; 2) the definition of the
deterrent process; 3) the variations in deterrence
that are a function of characteristics of threats
and the threatened; 4) the value and limitations of
alternative research strategies; and 5) the future of
deterrence research. Each of these issues is considered relative to the authors overriding concern
that deterrence be considered as a marginal (relative) not absolute concept. Thus, the question at
all times is whether a threat of the application of a
sanction and/or its application has the desired
effect on the occurrence or rate of a behavior relative to some higher or lower level of sanction.
In the consideration of the rationale of deterrence, the authors observe that the crime control
policy of all legal systems rests to varying degrees
on the concept of deterrence. While they contend
that there is debate over whether this should be
the case, the observation is made that throughout
the criminal justice system the assumption of the
validity of deterrence is accepted and defended
on the basis of demonstrably weak data and logic.
This obvious condition raises three related questions. First, what are the ethical implications of a
commitment to deterrence as a crime control
policy? Following a review of theories and conceptions of punishment, the authors conclude that if
deterrence is to be morally tolerable, it must:
1) recognize that deterrence involves the establishment of "principles of just dessert," that is, the
upper limits of punishment are related to the social
impact of the proscribed behavior; 2) include the
admission that little or no research has been
conducted that establishes the validity of deterrence and, therefore, the criminal justice system
must demand its own evaluation; and 3) allow
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for the offender's suffering to be included in the
calculation of the total costs of punishment.
The issue of cost raises the economic aspect of
the rationale of deterrence. Zimring and Hawkins
propose that for too long the economic analysis of
deterrence has not been seriously pursued. While
they note that economists are now beginning to
address the criminal law and the criminal justice
system' they suggest a complete model of cost has
not been developed. The outline of such a model is
developed as a guide to research that would be
relevant to public policy. The model includes the
components of program costs (inputs), the nature
of the program (process), the extent of the program's effects (the output in units of relative
deterrence) and the comparison of deterrent cost/
effectiveness to alternative modes of achieving
crime control (e.g., social prevention). This overly
simple model is amplified by an analysis of an
example from the literature on the changing of the
length of the term of sentence. This exposition,
however, is offered to further highlight the need
for research to establish the basis for a "rational
crime control policy" as opposed to the unsubstantiated one on which deterrence currently rests.
This, of course, raises the issue of the political
aspects of the rationale for deterrence, a necessary
ingredient in one's consideration of the modification of the current operationalization of and
commitment to deterrence in our criminal justice
system. Zimring and Hawkins observe that when
penalties or enforcement become too severe, they
can create social tensions and conflict. Obviously,
such tensions and conflicts will affect the enactors
of the deterrent process by either negating their
behavior (changes in other parts of the criminal
justice system) or compelling them to join the
efforts of those attempting to modify the system
(as the judges, police, wardens, etc., are those who
can most closely observe the malfunctioning of the
system). Again, this aspect of the rationale of
deterrence requires research to determine appropriate levels of sanctions and their application
(within constraints of morality and economics
noted above) in order to reduce the degree of
tension and conflict created by the use of deterrence as a crime control policy.
The resounding theme of Zimring and Hawkins'
analysis of the rationale of deterrence is the "need
for more (better) research" so as to move us from a
crime control policy based on bad data and logic to
Sullivan, Tie Economics of Crime: A Researck
Bibliography, 19 CanEx & DELINQENC 138 (1973).
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one constrained by morality and cost, but within
those constraints "rational"- that is, substantiated by acceptable research. While this can be
considered a trite request, their analysis firmly
establishes the request in a skillfully argued, if
overdrawn, analysis of existing policy.
The issues of the process of deterrence and the
variations in the impact of the deterrent process
involves an exposition of recent theory and research
from a variety of disciplines. This portion of the
book runs for one hundred and seventy-nine pages,
most of which deals with the issue of the source
of variations in the impact of the process.
The analysis of the process of deterrence first
involves the establishment of a common terminology. Zimring and Hawkins identify, for analytical
purposes, the following elements in the deterrent
process: threats, threatening agencies, threatened
behavior and threatened consequences. This
process is directed to an audience for the purpose
of a "channeling effect" (the totality of all changes
in the behavior of an audience attributable to the
existence of a threat); deterrence (those instances
of channeling that involve the failure to commit
the threatened behavior when it otherwise would
have been committed); net deterrence (the number
of behaviors deterred less the threatened behaviors
the threat creates); and, partial deterrence (involving either spatial deflection or a reduction in
the intensity of the threatened behavior). In the
development of this glossary of terms for the
analysis of deterrence, the authors reject the usual
distinction between general and specific deterrence
on the grounds that the process is identical in each
case, that both attempt to prevent future crime,
and that they differ only in that special deterrence
is a more intense form of deterrence in the sense
that the threat has been applied as a means of
effecting future behavior.
Following the analysis of these "essential terms,"
Zimring and Hawkins consider the process by
which legal threats achieve deterrence. They
identify four obviously related ways by which the
process can be achieved. First, the classical notion
of process involves some variation on the pleasurepain principle and a psychology of rational calculus. Second, the existence of threats and their
enactments can perform a "moral-educative"
effect. This process involves the role laws play in
the definition of the badness of behavior, the direct
impact of law and its enactment on the moral
development of the citizen, and the way the threat
system focuses the attention of citizens on certain
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behaviors and therefore encourages them to
consider the consequences of enacting the threatened behavior. Third, the legal threat system can
produce habitual behavior. Fourth, the enactment
of legal threats contributes to the establishment
of conforming behavior and an understanding and
respect for the law. The process of deterrence is
suggested as having a direct (the classical model)
and indirect (through its relationship to other
modes of socialization) effect on the occurrence of
the threatened behavior. The important issue of
the interaction of the elements of the process are
not adequately considered, leaving the process
relatively categorical and sterile.
The authors then observe that there are variations in the operation of this process, the major
source of these variations being the characteristics
of the actors to which the process applies, the
types of behavior that are being threatened, and
the types and severity (including certainty of
application) of the threatened consequences. In
this section the authors survey theory and research
in a highly instructive manner, in order to provide
some insight to the issues raised within each of
the sources of variation. The consideration of
variations in actors involves personality, attitudinal and social status differences. Basically, the
authors attempt to extrapolate from theory or
related research an understanding of the ways in
which these individual dimensions might affect
the reaction to threat. This represents a considerable degree of extension of the authors' previous
analysis of marginal groups, and alerts us to the
necessity of considering individual variation.
The analysis of the impact the type of threatened
behavior has on the deterrent process results in
the authors' basic acceptance of Chambliss' 5
distinction between instrumental and expressive
acts, and the recognition that threat is more likely
to be effective in the control of instrumental than
expressive acts. However, the authors, in keeping
with their emphasis on marginal deterrence, do
not accept the policy implications usually associated with this distinction. They state:
Although we have been concerned here with differences between types of offense, exclusive stress
on the nature of the offense can be misleading. It is
one thing to say that an act like homicide is "quite
resistant to punishment as a deterrent," for such
an act ifay well be relatively insensitive to modest
5 Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness
of Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. Ray. 703 (1967).

changes in penalty when the pre-barriers, other
than threat are strong and the consequences are
both severe-the death penalty or life imprisonment. It is quite another thing to suggest that the
homicide rate would be unaffected by a sharp decline in the penalty imposed when the pre-barriers
other than threat are relatively weak, for example,
in a "culture of violence." While the degree of
marginal deterrence achieved by the higher
penalty might still be less than in the case
of parking offenses it does not follow that such a
consideration should determine policy. 6
The total social cost model described earlier is
most appropriately used to consider the implications for policy of our knowledge of the sources of
variation. The deterrence of expressive acts may
be more socially desirable and therefore fewer
deterred acts result in higher social savings.
It is then observed that to be effective, threats
must be communicated, be considered by the
audience as directed at them, have credibility
(i.e., the perception that the threats are enforcedcertainty), be the type of threat that is appropriate
to the offense and its enactors, and be severe
enough to perform the range of functions outlined
above as the process of deterrence. The authors
carefully review most of the research literature on
these issues. Since most of these issues have evident
implications and since certainty and severity have
been so prominent in recent research on deterrence,
I will convey the authors' consideration of these
in some detail.
Zimring and Hawkins note that the research
they review on the credibility of the threat is not
conclusive. They review instances of the elimination of police (during World War II), police
"holidays," changes in enforcement patterns, and
Tittle's analysis of the relationship between crime
rates and the rate of incarceration for index
offenses by state. The authors conclude that this
evidence is not consistent, that it fails to consider
the causal order between rates of threatened
behavior and changes in credibility, that there are
obvious problems of measurement (e.g., variations
in police recording practices), and that no change
in credibility can be effective unless the change is
effectively communicated.
The analysis of the consequences of variations
in the severity of threatened consequences leads
Zimring and Hawkins to a more forceful conclusion. Primarily, on the basis of recent survey
6

Znmmi &HAwKiNs, supranote 3, at 141.
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research (Gibbs7 and TittleS), the authors conclude
that "increases in legislatively provided penalties
for major crimes have little impact as a marginal
general deterrent." 9 The authors then proceed to
suggest a theoretical basis for this conclusion
(based on their earlier analysis of sources of variation) and then observe that this would suggest
experimental reduction of maximum threatened
consequences, while not entirely precluding some
consideration of escalation of threatened consequences, but only under conditions of strict
evaluation.
Because Zimring and Hawkins fail to fully
0
analyze the research on certainty and severity,'
at
work
published
a
to
consider
it is instructive
the same time as theirs, a review article by Tittle
and Logan. n They conclude that:
Almost all research since 1960 supports the view
that negative sanctions are significant variables
in the explanation of conformity and deviance.
Therefore social scientists would appear to be on
firm ground in at least treating the issue of deterrence as an open question. Enough suggestive evidence has been compiled to warrant systematic research efforts and to mandate serious theoretical
consideration of the role of sanctions in human
behavior and social organization. It is ciear, however, that the evidence is not conclusive. At this
point we can safely say only that sanctions apparently have some deterrent effect under some
circumstances. It is now necessary to undertake
careful research in an attempt to specify the conditions under which sanctions are likely to be important influences on behavior. Consideration of
past, research suggests many gaps in our knowledge. A variety of questions must be investigated
before effective theory building can be undertaken
and before social science can claim to speak with
much confidence about the role of sanctions in human affairs."
Thus, the far more exhaustive and concise review
7
Gibbs, Crime, Punishment and Deterrence, 48 Sw.
Soc. Sci. Q. 2 (1968).
8 Tittle, Crime Rates and Legal Sanctions, 16 SocAL
PROBTxS 409 (1969).
9Zn:RG & HAw~Ins, supra note 3, at 201.
10Recent work that is most notably absent from adequate consideration in the review include Chiricos &
Waldo, Punishment and Crime. An Examination of
Some Empirical Evidence, 18 SocL. PxoBI.EMs 200
(1970); Gray & Martin, Punishment and Deterrence:
Another Analysis of Gibb's Data, 50 Soc. Sc. Q. 189
(1969); Logan, General Deterrent Effects of Imprisonment, 51 SociAL FoRCEs 64 (1972).
1 Tittle & Logan, Sanctions and Deviance: Evidence
and Remaining Questions, 7 LAw & SocrETv REvrxw
371 (1973).
12d.at 315.
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of research leads Tittle and Logan to a less conclusive position-one that allows for the further
consideration of severity as well as certainty in the
elaboration of a useable model of deterrence.
The issue of future research is addressed by both
Zimring and Hawkins and Tittle and Logan. The
latter conclude that research priorities include:
1) the influence of the type of norm on deterrence;
2) the relationship between variations in the behavior threatened and deterrence; 3) the relationship between the actor's characteristics and deterrent effectiveness (e.g., class, attitude, etc.); 4) the
relationship between the characteristics of threats
and deterrence (including applicability, credibility,
severity, etc.); 5) the interrelationship of the
above; and 6) the relative crime control effect of
deterrence and/or other strategies (e.g., social
change). The similarity of these issues to those
identified by Zimring and Hawkins should by now
be obvious. In establishing an agenda for research,
however, Zimring and Hawkins are even more
explicit. They identify six specific areas of inquiry
in which these and other issues are to be resolved.
They are social control of the drunk driver, control
of urban street crime through intensive enforcement, countermeasures to folk crimes, traffic
offenses, variations in sanctions for serious crimes
and the consideration of selected decriminalization.
For each of these areas there is a general discussion
of the procedures to be followed in conducting
research to arrive at a more rational policy for the
control of the specified threatened behavior.
Neither the specific problem areas or the proposed
research is adequately conceptualized or delineated. In particular, the suggested research is
not likely to approximate a resolution of the major
issues that have been identified in the analysis of
deterrence.
The above clearly describes, I trust, the substantive contributions and conclusions of the
authors' analysis of deterrence. I find few of them
startling, only some particularly insightful, and all
of them leading to one conclusion-the need for
more and better research. The compilation and
organization of this material is, as was suggested
earlier, to be commended and will guarantee that
this study will become a constant source-work.
However, the exegesis rarely breaks new ground;
it, like the Tittle and Logan article, tells us where
we are-obviously an important step before we
move forward.
In his preface to the book, James Vorenberg
observes that Zimring and Hawkins have made a

19741

BOOK REVIEWS

significant methodological contribution, through
their analysis of alternative research strategies
and their development of an "important model
which should be followed" in future research. 3
Given the emphasis throughout the book on the
importance of research, I would agree with Professor Vorenberg that the methodological issues
are significant, once the rudiments of the conceptual issue are established. It is to this issue,
the last of the major issues discussed by Zimring
and Hawkins, that I now turn. In the course of
the discussion of the methodological issues analyzed by Zimring and Hawkins, I will identify
what I consider to be major problems with their
treatment of methodology and deterrence.
The first methodological problem confronting
those who would study deterrence involves the
operationalization of the concept itself. How shall
we measure the occurrence of the threatened
behavior, (e.g. crimes known to police; arrests;
imprisonment; self reports; victimization)? Zimring
and Hawkins make the usual points regarding the
problems of official data and then suggest victimization or self report data as the best indication.
In this regard, the National Survey of Victimization that is to be conducted yearly by the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration beginning
this year should resolve some of the major measurement issues.
It should be kept in mind, however, that public
policy has at least two notions of the dependent
variable: criminal behavior and the amount of
crime that citizens demand that the public sector
control. Thus, those crimes that the public does
not choose to report might legitimately be excluded
in the testing of the deterrence model and therefore
need not be included in the consideration of the
selection of an appropriate measurement procedure
for the dependent variable. In addition, it may well
be that relationships between either criminal
behavior or police recorded crime and other variables may be very similar. Thus, for example,
Hirschi reports that whether delinquency is measured by police contacts or self reports has little
effect on the form of the relationship between
delinquency and selected causal variables."
Finally, depending on the level of aggregation, the
relationship between rates of crime known to
police and, for example, rates of victimization may
be quite high. As Ennis states, "it is important to
emphasize that although there are considerable

18ZnULMG & HAwEiNs, supra note 3, at xii.
I T. HrascmI, TAE CAusSF- Or DELINQUENCY (1971).

differences in the amount of crime known to police
as estimated by the survey and by the UCR,
nevertheless the relative frequency of different
crimes measured by the two systems is strikingly
similar with the previously noted exception of
auto theft." 15 Also, the ranking of offenses by the
victimization rate and the U.C.R. rate is identical
in the 1965 national survey of victimization." In
sum, the measurement problem of the dependent
variable may not be as problematic as Zimring
and Hawkins suggest. Similarly, the measurement
of certainty, severity, type of sanction, type of
actor (i.e., the deterrence-specific independent
variables) do not represent significant measurement problems once the dependent variable is adequately measured.
Assuming we understand and have measured
adequately each of the variables involved in the
deterrence-specific model, two issues remain: 1)
how to conceptualize and organize alternative or
related causal mechanisms (i.e., the relationship
between threats and other socializing and social
control mechanisms); and 2) how to develop the
appropriate research design to evaluate the total
model On the issue of conceptualizing the relative
importance and interaction of threats and other
sources of conformity and deviance, Zimring and
Hawkins suggest the necessity of comparing threat
and alternative "crime prevention" strategies but
are not instructive on the way in which this is to
be conceptualized or tested. Their primary concern
seems to be the measurement of the independent
effect of deterrence, not the construction of a more
complete theoretical model in which the role of
threat could be elaborated. This becomes evident
as we consider their analysis of research strategies
(which of course are not to be construed as substitutes for adequate conceptualization).
The authors characterize, criticize and suggest
partial remedies for comparative research, retrospective research, induced retrospective designs,
field experiments and survey (attitudinal) research.
While, I think erroneously, concluding that the
ideal method for evaluating threats is the experiment, Zimring and Hawkins begin with comparative research. This reflects the predominance of this
mode in current efforts, and the advantages this
method has over techniques requiring the inducement of change, the control of environments
(experimentation) or the reliance on attitudes as a

15P.ENNis, ClmRAL VICTnZATON INTHE UirED
STATFs: A RxPORT O A NATIONAL SuRvEy 13 (1967).
16Id. at 8.
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significant intervening ingredient (survey research
as discussed by Zimring and Hawkins).
In their analysis of comparative research (i.e.,
comparing variations at some level of aggregation)
the authors correctly observe that conclusions
drawn from such comparisons must be carefully
drawn so as not to assume that variation is due to
the level of threat, when in fact threat level is
related to some other "causal variable." This issue,
described usually under the rubric of multicollinearity, is of course not unique to deterrence
research. Therefore, Zimring and Hawkins' solutions are similarily not unique-matching or some
variation of multiple regression. However, they
are not convinced of the value of the latter, because
they are 'qimited by the fact that they can only
test the separate effect of punishment policy
if... policy varies independently of other factors." 17
The issue is, I suggest, more than methodological. The conceptual argument must be made more
precise. As a first step, I would agree that crime
control policy is a response to an existing social
and demographic structure and is therefore dependent itself on that structure. In addition, the
criminal justice system is (with some time lag)
responsive to the level of threatened behavior.
This suggests a model that would, using the level
of threatened behaviors as the dependent variable,
assign social and demographic characteristics
causal priority to legal threats and their enactment
in a recursive stage. The second stage of this model
would be non-recursive reflecting the feedback the
17Z111RING & HAwK1Ns, supra note

3, at 268.
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level of threatened behavior has on the system of
threats. The proper evaluation of such a model
would suggest the direct and indirect effects of all
elements on the dependent variable. The technique
to which I am referring, one not discussed by
Zimring and Hawkins, is path analysis-a methodology recently introduced into the social sciences
as a means of testing causal models." If Zimring
and Hawkins would have given such developments
consideration, they could have more completely
accomplished what Vorenberg suggests they did,
the development of a model and a method for the
analysis of the determinants of variation in rates
of threatened behavior.
In this review, particularly in the analysis of
the contributions of this work, I have been somewhat critical. In closing let me modify that criticism by reconsidering the potential audience of
the book. In a review of this same book, judge
Frankel hails it as one of the most significant
works on this topic in our time. Certainly, for
those not familiar with research or theory construction; not involved in research concerning
similar issues and methods; and, looking for
guidance as they attempt to change our current
criminal justice system, this work will provide a
useful and valuable guide. However, policy-makers
must also receive a companion to this volume,
one that clearly establishes the total model for
the prevention and control of proscribed behaviors,
thus providing the rationale for a reconsideration
of the basis of our response to crime.
13For a summary analysis of this technique, see
Land, Principles of Path Analysis, in SociorOGicAL
METODOLOGY (E. Borgatta ed. 1969).
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CRIMINAL SENTENCING: POINT AND COUNTERPOINT*
EUGENE Z. DUBOSE, JR.**
I'm not quite sure whether the maxim should
be never to try to review a friend's book or not. On
the one hand, to know the writer outside of his book
* A review article of CuMISNAL SENTENCES: LAW
Wrnou Q0D Rn.By Marin E. Frankd. New York:
Hill and Wang, 1972. Pp. x, 124. $5.95.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. Mr. Dubose was a law clerk
for Judge Frankel, 1970-71.

is to understand his innuendo and recognize his inflection; you are not as likely to be misled by a
maladroit or inaccurate phrase. On the other hand,
you run considerable risk of gilding an undeserving
lily or two in the process; you find yourself unconsciously completing the half-made arguments and
limiting the overexpansive ones, simply because
you know that's how they're intended.
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None of this is to say that Judge Frankel's
compact volume is inaccurate, half-baked or
otherwise shoddy-in fact my opinion is quite
the opposite: that the book is well and interestingly
-written, with an appeal that should extend beyond
us lawyers-but rather to say that if it is these
bad things, I may not be the one to perceive it.
It may be, in the case of this book, that this
sort of insensitivity is a disabling characteristic
in a reviewer, for much of how one takes this book
depends on one's perception of its tone. Judge
Frankel has some harsh things to say about the
sentencing process, and I suppose that if one were
ungenerous one might read the book as saying
harsh things about those who administer the
system. Take a paragraph like the following:
Conditioned in the direction of authoritarianism
by his daily life in court, long habituated as
a lawyer to the stance of the aggressive contestant,
and exercising sentencing powers frequently without practical limits, the trial judge is not discouraged from venting any tendencies toward
righteous arrogance. The books and the reliable
folklore are filled with the resulting horror stories
-of fierce sentences and orgies of denunciatory attacks upon defendants. One need not be a revolutionist or an enemy of the judiciary to predict that
untrained, untested, unsupervised men armed with
great power will perpetrate abuses. The horrible
cases may result from moral or intellectual or
physical deficiences-or from all together. But we
can be sure there will be some substantial number
of such cases.1
Perhaps it does not take much imagination to
find in this or in his pungent observations that a
judge will spend more time on the breach of contract for delivery of onions than on the imposition
of a ten year sentence a slur on Judge Frankel's
brethren of the bench. Withal, though the book is
not an argument ad honines, Judge Frankel did not
write to attract the lightweight radicals. If his
language is direct, that's no sin; why mince words
about brutality, indifference or inequity. And to
say that he documents horribles only describes half
the book, the half titled "The Problem;" the rest of
the book is given to a discussion of more positive
things-'Talliatives, Remedies and Directions of
Hope," as he calls them. Recall, too, that he participates in this process. If he criticizes other judges,
he criticizes himself; if other judges sentence without any notion why, he is not necessarily much less
S TENcEs: LAW WiTrIM. FRANEL, CRnmA SL
OUT ORDER 17 (1972) [hereafter cited as FRAwKEL].

at sea for pointing this out. When he states that
"[jiudges are on the whole more likely to have
known personally tax evaders, or people just like
tax evaders, than car thieves or dope pushers," he
is not speaking of an abstract statistical phenomenon, but of a potent type of bias that he himself
must grapple with whenever he gives a white collar
embezzler a shorter sentence than he gave the cocaine salesman -who immediately preceded him
before the bench. It should become obvious that
Judge Frankel is not just worried about the bad or
incompetent people who may participate in the
sentencing process, but concerns himself more with
the particular problems that arise if we try to
justify our system of sentencing as a system of law.
Those elements which distinguish what most of us
refer to as law-decisions which are based on reliable evidence and whose principles are publicly
expressed-are missing from the legal process of
sentencing. Lon Fuller once listed the eight ways
one could fail to make law.2 In most of these important respects, modem sentencing fails to live up
to the evenhandedness of 'law." Judge Frankel
sees sentencing as law without order; we might
equally well call it orders without law.
If there is a persistent or characteristic failure
2

His "eight distinct routes to disaster" were:
The first and most obvious lies in a failure to
achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be
decided on an ad hoc basis. The other routes are:
(2) a failure to publicize, or at least to make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected
to observe; (3) the abuse of retroactive legislation,
which not only cannot itself guide action, but
undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in
effect, since it puts them under the threat of retrospective change; (4) a failure to make rules understandable; (5) the enactment of contradictory
rules or (6) rules that require conduct beyond
the powers of the affected party; (7) introducing
such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them; and, finally,
(8) a failure of congruence between the rules as
announced and their actual administration.
L. FuiLE, Tnx MonA.nTy or

LAW

39 (1964). Maybe

we should not weigh in quite the same balance the primary rules governing conduct that Fuller was concerned
with and remedial matters like sentencing; the rule,
one might argue, needs to be more regular and regularly applied than the remedy. Such a notion, however,
is simply another manifestation of the lack of attention
that sentencing gets. It is via the sentence that the
primary rule is enforced: it is the mechanism by which
we exercise social control in the criminal law. Insofar
as it fails to achieve the regularity we require of the
rest of the legal process, the rules governing behavior
will themselves be altered. When judges fail to punish
for a crime, the action involved then becomes no crime.
This may in fact be the most important message of the
contempt trials arising out of the Chicago Seven Trial:
that what might otherwise be a contempt is not a
crime when the trial itself has become a circus.
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among those who administer this system, it is not
necessarily that they are pusillanimous or evil. It
is more that they, like all of us, see the purposes
of laws and sentencing differently and, given their
heads, they are as likely as not, and for what they
perceive as the best of reasons, to sentence like
men who have committed like crimes to different
punishments. Judge Frankel does not try to prove
empirically that this sort of variation exists. Nor
do I suspect that he really could prove it: so long
as important factors in the process like presentence
reports remain confidential, we cannot even
estimate to what extent individual criminals are
alike or unlike.3 But we should not, where a man's
liberty is the issue, wait on empirical proof of
irrationality; the stakes are too high, and common
sense tells us (and anecdotal observation confirms)
that sentencing is a very random thing. No judge
would think to issue an order for specific performance of a contract for the sale of widgets
without an opinion; should the decision to send a
man to prison deserve anything less? In practical
terms, this means sentencing opinions and review
of sentencing; but appellate courts neither encourage the former nor seek the latter.
The stickiest business for appeal is of course
the length of sentence, the real heart of the matter
as far as the convict is concerned. One senses that
for all the doctrine expended to forbid appealability
of sentences, the main reason is appellate court
judges' disinclination to get involved in the nasty
business. If, as Judge Frankel suggests, trial court
judges are somewhat removed by practice from
the common experience of people, this must be
doubly true for the appellate judge, whose normal
routine is limited to briefs and oral arguments on

neatly-drawn, appealable issues and who can, if
luck prevails, go for months at a time without so
much as setting eyes on a live litigant. It is araefied
atmosphere, and the scent of sentencing may be a
bit too strong for those Olympian nostrils. But
there is no good reason why the issue should not be
appealable. It cannot be that it is not justiciable: if
that were true, how could a trial judge concern himself with the question? Perhaps appellate judges,
like me, suspect that there is no rational way to
approach sentencing and would rather leave dark
corners lightless.
But there are some matters short of sentencing
review, and closer than that to the normal issues
that appeals deal with that appellate courts can
settle up. The evidence that the trial court looks
to in piecing together both the man and the crime
is one such matter. I think I reveal no confidences
when I relate some of the events of public record
which transpired in United States v. Sweig,4 in
regard to the evidentary considerations in sentencing. In that case, a jury had convicted Martin
Sweig, a former aide to Speaker of the House
John W. McCormick, of perjury before a grand
jury investigating government corruption; at the
same time it acquitted him of other counts of
perjury, of conspiracy to defraud the United
States, of conflict of interest and of improper
influence on government officials.' After conviction, Sweig refused to speak with Federal probation
officials and generally clammed up about any
knowledge of official misconduct that he might or
might not have. Judge Frankel, who had presided
at Sweig's trial, put many of his thoughts on the
record at the sentencing hearing, including the
following:

3 Occasionally we can infer the factors that go into
sentencing. During the Vietnam War individual judges,
for example, were known to have been particularly
harsh or lenient with those convicted of draft evasion.
Some judges consistently sentenced convicted offenders
to the maximum five-year term; others consistently put
offenders on probation or "sentenced" them to alternative service. It is not farfetched to read into these
sentencing disparities the judges' underlying opinions
of the rightness of the war in Vietnam, but this sort
of inference can only be taken so far. Reviewing the
studies of sentencing that had been done, one commentator concluded that
the complexity of the sentencing process, not to
mention the process of human judgment, has been
all but submerged in simplistic interpretations
based upon fragmentary data.
Green, Research on [Sentencing] Disparitiesin 2 CRmE

I understand that you intend to appeal for this
judgment of conviction ... and... that this...
makes it advisable in your judgment and that of
your counsel that you continue your silence about
the facts of this case....
[Tihis creates something of a problem. For example, in considering the degree to which you
might have information about irregularities or corruption in the government, which was the subject
of the investigation in which you became embroiled... I am more or less required to take into
account the responsible things stated by the government's representatives even beyond what is
proved in evidence at a trial when I come to sen-
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4454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972).
6See United States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.),
cert. dened, 403 U.S. 932 (1971).
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tence. But even aside from that, you remember
that there was substantial evidence at the trial
which indicated gross irregularities, misuse of government facilities, abuse of government trust, and
...I think it is appropriate, and I state for the
record the view, that I not ignore these things in
considering this delicate question of sentence. I
don't know if I could ignore them if I tried, but I
state explicitly that I am not ignoring them, and
that the picture of collaboration between you and
Mr. [Nathan] Voloshen [a codefendent who
pleaded guilty] is part of what runs through my
mind now as I consider this tough questiontougher for you than for me, obviously-of your
sentence. 6
He went on to point out that Mr. Sweig's earlier
perjury and present silence had thwarted and
continued to thwart an investigation of corruption;
he concluded by inviting Mr. Sweig to file a motion
to reduce sentence under Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure after appeal. Although no unqualified promise was made, it was
clear that Mr. Sweig's willingness to talk then
about his involvement in this corruption would
weigh in his favor. After the court of appeals
affirmed the conviction, Mr. Sweig returned to
judge Frankel and, having maintained his obdurate silence throughout, moved under Rule 35 for
a reduction in sentence. The motion was denied,
and Mr. Swieg appealed again-this time on the
grounds that the sentence was imposed with the
intent of coercing him into abandoning his privilege against self-incrimination and was based on
evidence rejected by the jury. He lost again.
In this second appeal, the court of appeals
simply stated that these arguments were without
merit; for the discretion of a sentencing judge is
"very broad," and in exercising it the judge "may
and should consider matters that would not be
admissible at a trial." 7 While I may agree with
the result that the court reached, certainly the
questions Mr. Sweig raised deserved more consideration then the appellate opinion gave them.
It cannot really be, as the court implies, that the
various safeguards of the fourth, fifth and sixth
amendments disappear with the verdict.
There does not seem to be much problem with a
judge evaluating for himself the evidence which
the verdict would indicate the jury disbelieved.
In the first place, there is a strong possibility that
6454 F.2d at 182-83 n.2.
7454 F.2d at 183-84.

the jury did not disbelieve the evidence; trial
lawyers with more experience than I can recount
numerous instances where the jury, faced with a
multiple indictment, only convicted the defendent
of a single count although substantially identical
evidence was offered on other counts. This sort of
phenomenon is apparently common enough that an
appellate court, when faced with a defendent
convicted of one crime and acquitted of a lesser,
included crime by the same jury, will not consider
that there has been some sort of illegitimate compromise verdict as they would in an analogous
civil case Moreover, it may be that something
less than belief beyond a reasonable doubt of facts
will justify their use in sentencing, so that, just as a
criminal acquittal does not preclude a later civil
trial on essentially the same matter, there is no
collateral estoppel. Of course the problem here is
that since courts have not really considered very
many of the evidentiary issues that arise in sentencing, no one can say whether relying on matters
proved by the preponderance of the evidence is the
rule or the exception. And as judge Frankel
remarked to Mr. Sweig, perhaps it is unrealistic
to expect a sentencing judge to ignore his own view
of the evidence.9
To justify, perhaps, lesser sins by greater ones,
I should note that courts have had no problem in
permitting sentencing judges to use evidence
obtained much less formally and reliably than in a
courtroom; neither hearsay rules nor exclusionary
rules arising out of constitutional privilege can
keep evidence from the sentencing judge.10 The
presentence report that the probation department
prepares is pure hearsay, much of it from the
attorney who has just prosecuted the defendant to
conviction; no court seems ever to have thought
that its use might be illegal or even inadvisable."
8 United States v. Carbone, 378 F.2d 420 (2d Cir.)
(Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 914 (1967); Steckler
v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925) (L.
Hand, J.).
9Perhaps this should mean sentencing by a judge
oter than the one who presided at trial, if we are convinced that a sentencing judge should ignore juryrejected evidence. To do that, of course, would sacrifice
one other virtue of the present system: a sentencer
who may see the full scope of the evidence of the crime.
10 Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959) (hearsay); United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971) (information
taken from illegal wiretaps which had been excluded
at trial).
U In one case an appellate court held that sentencing
without a presentence report was reversible error.
Peters v. United States, 307 F.2d 193 (1962).
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In general, the reports are confidential and not even
shown to defense attorneys. Judge Frankel sets out
,ne compelling example calling for confidentiality,2
but cites thereafter a case showing the horrendous
effects that misinformation delivered through the
probation system can have.13 Surely the defendant
should have an opportunity to tell his side of the
story or rebut inaccurate information in a fashion
that will carry some assurance of honesty and
authenticity. Does the Constitution require this
opportunity? Is impromptu rebuttal of the convicted defendant or his lawyer at the sentencing
hearing-or in chambers beforehand-adequate?
Or, in such a setting, will courts recognize the
stakes and incentives, and simply discount it all?
I am not sure that I know any of the answers here,
but I am quite sure that the normal-common law
processes of appeal-processes which I have a cerat 30-31:
The confidential informant is, of course, a menacing and dangerous creature. He plays, nevertheless, an ancient, and not uniformly dishonorable,
role in law enforcement. In the flesh, moreover,
he may be more appealing than sinister. Consider,
for example, a case of mine involving a persistent,
hardened, violent criminal about whom it was
difficult to learn anything ostensibly favorable.
The only item inconsistent with his general pattern of wickedness was his report of tender devotion to his wife, confirmed by her in his presence
to the probation officer. The probation officer also
reported that the wife had later come to see him
alone, expressing unqualified hatred of the defendant and explaining that she had lied earlier because
her husband, repeatedly and violently assaultive,
had threatened to kill her if she did otherwise.
The officer suggested that I grant the wife's request
to see her alone. I did. She confirmed, in seemingly
great fear, what the probation officer had given
as her true views. She documented the tales of
violence with police and court records. I believed
her. It remains possible she was perpetrating a
clever pattern of falsehoods. Should I, in any
event, have compelled her to tell her story on the
record? Or should I have disclosed what she had
said to the defendant? Or should I have attempted,
with whatever success, to "strike" her ex parte
testimony and cause it to play no part in the sentencing? I do not suggest these are easy questions.
I do not tender my negative answers to them as
certainly correct. I merely give the example as
some evidence that the attractive idea of full disclosure
at all times may be excessive.
1 3State v. Pohlabel, 61 N.J. Super. 242, 160 A.2d
647 (1960), discussed in FRANKEL at 32-33. In 1951,
Mr. Pohlabel pleaded guilty to seven counts of forgery
on checks amounting to $1,467; he was sentenced to
21 to 35 years. In 1959, after serving eight years of this
sentence, he discovered that the presentence report had
inaccurately represented that he had lived a life of
crime and was on parole from a life sentence, when in
fact his only conviction had been one for car theft in
1943, when he was 18 years old. Presented with this
evidence, the superior court ordered resentencing-on
the basis of a new presentence report.
12 FRANKEL
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tain confidence in-will never test these problems,
will never consider the parameters of right and
privilege involved here, so long as appellate courts
perform as they did in Sweig.14
The other question raised by the Sweig appeal
is an even harder one: can threat of a harsh sentence be used to coerce a convicted defendant to
surrender constitutional rights, specifically, the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination? Once the trial determining guilt has ended,
most of us tend to regard the ensuing procedure
as one in which the sole virtue is the discovery of
information to base a sound sentencing judgment
on. In this picture the fifth amendment has no
place; the game has been played and lost, and the
rules of that game are no longer applicable. But
whether this should be the case has not received
much thought. If, for example, the prime value
inherent in the testimonial privilege is a preservation of privacy against governmental intrusion,
then it makes no difference whether the defendant
asserts his privilege before or after conviction. As
a practical matter, the truth of the crime may be a
great deal worse than the evidence at trial indicated
and for the defendant to reveal it is to sentence
himself to a longer prison term than he would
otherwise have had to bear. Whatever our feeling
about this single-crime situation, though, Sweig
was a more complex case than that since the
detailing of his crime- perjury- and, more
particularly, its motives, would surely have led to
the revelation of other crimes: it is difficult to
imagine one willing to perjure himself for wholly
innocent reasons. Surely even a convicted defendant may assert his privilege to refuse to testify
about other crimes in which he may have been
involved. Or is that privilege somehow diminished
by the practical knowledge that prosecuting
attorneys are usually satisfied with a single criminal
conviction against any given defendant? In this
case in particular, the United States Attorney was
not so much interested in hounding Mr. Sweig as
he was in prosecuting others involved in corrupting
the government. Do we have to perform the
semantic gymnastics necessary to distinguish the
taking account of a failure to come clean from the
14United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.
1973), is a more recent example of a judicial nondecision
on these issues. Disapproving of the failure of the trial
court to give defendant an opportunity to rebut statements by the prosecuting attorney, and for that reason
vacating the sentence, the court "hoped," without
holding, that courts in the future would "make increasing use of their discretion to disclose." Id. at 1230 n. 24.
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coercing of testimony about this or other crimes? 5
Is it important that this particular type of crime
is one likely only to come to light through the
testimony of one of the participants?
These are serious questions and ones very important to the operation of our system of criminal
justice. Judge Franke's thesis is not simply that
these questions get answered wrongly, but that
presently there is no forum in which to ask themexcept in the rare case, such as Sweig, where the
sentencing judge is honest or foolish" enough to
put on the public record the reasons underlying his
sentence. To wax anecdotal, during sentencing
hearings in my brief year of clerking, a year primarily given over to criminal trials, and the year
prior to the Marx Lectures at the law school of the
University of Cincinnati whence sprang this book, I
often heard Judge Frankel put on the record his
candid views about the problems of sentencing the
particular defendant before him. Unlike most
defendants in most courts, those that he sentenced
had a fair crack-on appeal or otherwise-at the
sentences they-got. I hope that now, having read
Judge Frankel's book, more sentencing judges will
similarly open themselves up to an otherwise
avoidable reversal.
Judge Frankel has some modest procedural
suggestions to correct some of the irregularities
the system is subject to. To the judiciary, he
16At least one court has tried to do something like
this, by distinguishing between self-incrimination and
the incrimination of others who were involved with the
defendant in illegal activities. judge Moore, writing
the opinion in United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d
72, 76 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 911 (1971),
justified the sentencing procedure as follows:
The line here between "cooperation" with law enforcement authorities and the court vis-a-vis past
suspicious activities, on the one hand, and subjecting one's self to self-incrimination, on the other,
is quite visible .... The (sentencing] Court was
engaged in an inquiry as to whether appellant
wished to cooperate with the public authorities by
giving information apparently regarding others
involved in illegal international narcotics traffic.
Perhaps for reasons involving a personal moral
code, personal safety or otherwise, appellant chose
to remain silent. [emphasis in original]
Frankly I do not see the line so clearly as Judge Moore
does; perhaps he can see how a man can incriminate
others with whom he participated in illegal activity
without incriminating himself, but I cannot. This is, to
say the least, not the deferrence which the privilege
against self-incrimination normally receives.
15Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941, 944 (5th
Cir. 1966) and Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264
(D.C. Cir. 1969) are examples of judges who both
tried at sentencing to get defendants to confess to the
crimes of which they had been convicted. Both cases
were returned for resentencing; on remand I imagine
that neither judge was so candid about his motives.

suggests sentencing councils (i.e., sentencing
either by more than a single judge or by a single
judge in consultation with others) and appellate
review of sentencing; to the legislature, elaboration
of the purposes for sentencing and the creation of a
national sentencing commission. These are very
lawyerlike things to suggest, and they may not
change very much, even if accepted. The existence
of sentencing councils in federal district courts has
not done away with hanging judges, and I think I
reveal no trade secrets to confide that appellate
review may sometimes do more to entrench injustice than relieve it. But these steps do promise
some hope of regularity and openness, two qualities very close to the essence of justice.
Shall I be forgiven, though, if I admit that I
wonder whether there is any real hope of bringing
rationality to sentencing? To me, the goals of
sentencing are either unattainable, contradictory
or absurd. judge Frankel picks five as the purposes
of the process: retribution, deterrence, denunciation, incapacitation and rehabilitation. If we
really took deterrence seriously, we would simply
sentence the offender to the maximum possible
sentence. New York has taken this approach with
folk in the drug trade, and its experience should
prove instructive. Moreover, since measuring
differential deterrence-i.e., how much extra
deterrence we get when we add a month or a year
to a sentence-is probably impossible, our whole
theory comes down to a crude, unquantifiable
notion that some punishment will deter some
people from doing some things. It is really no more
than a hunch. If anyone is interested, my hunch
is that only a few crimes are really deterrable:
mostly white-collar crimes (e.g., tax evasion) and
professional crime, ones where the actors probably
do sit down and think about the consequences of
what they are doing. But even in those cases, whatever deterrent effect may exist is certainly diminished for those who are wise enough-and it may
be many-to know about how erratically the
criminal justice system works, about the high rate
of unsolved (and sometimes undiscovered) crime,
about the possibilities for corruption, about the
tactical advantages of the plea bargain, and about
the vagaries of trials by juries. Assume, though,
that deterrence is a knowable something; doesn't
the achieving of that goal conflict with rehabilitation? Those who study these things tell us that
long prison terms are inherently debilitating for
the majority of prisoners; hence, the longer the
terms (and hypothetically the better the deter-
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rence), the less the rehabilitation. Perhaps this
conflict is chimerical: in practice, rehabilitation
has never been a significant factor in sentencing
or penal policy. Even rudimentary things like
job-training are routinely ignored; where prisons
formally teach convicts skills (as distinguished
from the informal processes where the prisoner
learns better the skills of crime) they are as like
as not to teach a skill like license-plate making
which, when practiced as private enterprise, will
return the practitioner to the place where he
learned the trade. In short, rehabilitation is pap
for the faint-hearted.
Incapacitation does not give us much guidance
either. In order really to play a part in a rational
system, the judge must be able to do more than
just guess whether, if released, the convicted
defendant would really do all or some of those
things which his prison sentence is supposed to
incapacitate him from. And the present state of
the art is such that we cannot really say very much
about what anyone is likely to do in the future.
The most reliable statistics that we have-that
those who go to prison once will very likely again
commit a crime serious enough for a second termare enough to give us pause if we think that prison
protects anyone from anything.
But perhaps most fundamentally, if we are to
do any of these sophisticated things, we need to
know a great deal more than we do about what
prisons do to their inmates and how they do itand need to convey that information in some
digestible form to the sentencing judge. Until that
time, all this talk about the aims of sentencing is
fairly pointless. With regard to these questions of
how to run what kinds of prisons-and whether
to run any at all (questions certainly of more
moment than the procedural neatness of sentencing
itself)-Judge Frankel maintains an honest silence.
I would find it refreshing to discover, if it were
any news to me, that Judge Frankel is among that
rare breed of intellectual critter that does not
believe that authority entitles it to claims of
omniscience. He is a lawyer and a judge and confines his suggestions to matters in the trade that
he is familiar with-and matters clearly within and
governable by the traditional values of our jurisprudence.
I do not have much doubt at the end of it all
that sentences are imposed mostly for punishment,
as retribution for the act done and perhaps in
addition because the defendant is without re-
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deeming social value or grace. And perhaps if all
of what Judge Frankel proposes were to come to
pass, we would be doing not much more than
regularizing our vengeance. But, as Judge Frankel
demonstrates, to be cruel evenhandedly is no
mean task.
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By Edwin M. Schur.

Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973.
Pp. 180. $2.45 (Paper).
In this monograph Edwin M. Schur attempts to
classify, in orderly fashion, some of the voluminous
and confusing literature relating to juvenile delinquency. Recognizing that delinquency is a
legislative and social construct, Schur agrees that
what is said to be our delinquent problem and what
our delinquency policies are is a problematic affair.
What he particularly calls attention to is how the
delinquent problem and policies are influenced by
theory and research, and how theory development
and research efforts are in turn affected.
Considering this interactional process and
recognizing that there exist other patterned reactions to delinquency (e.g., "get-tough antipermissive"), Schur settles on three ways (ideal types)
which are influential in viewing delinquency: Individual Treatment, Liberal Reform and Radical
Nonintervention. Within each type he links the
particular orientations of that policy to its theoretical-empirical groundings.
Although one can argue specific points, on the
whole Schur's persuasive arguments, as well as his
review of the evidence, effectively challenge the
underlying assumptions and many of the goals
central to the Individual Treatment and Liberal
Reform patterns. However, his case in support of a
policy of Radical Nonintervention does not rest on
direct evidence of its success. The justification for
this policy shift is based on sociologicalperspectives
and diverse empirical evidence directing our attention to the failure and unintended consequences
of the other two policy orientations.
For public policy Radical Nonintervention
would make the core focus: "leave the kid alone
whenever possible." It would narrow the scope of
community standards to which all youth must
adjust. The significant difference which is seen
between delinquents and other youth is that the
former have been legally processed and labeled.
The individual's destiny in the juvenile justice
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system will not be directly or primarily determined
by his psyche or socioeconomic attributes, but
shaped by interactional and processing contingencies which also gives shape to delinquency rates.
What Schur deals with is available elsewhere, but
not in this kind of package. He has done an excellent and insightful job of organizing and interrelating policies, practices, theories and empirical
evidence. This is a paperback which should be read
by all practitioners. Theories, empirical studies,
treatments and policies are usually offered up in
other works as separate entities. Whatever else is
assigned in delinquency courses, this reviewer
thinks the inclusion of Schur's monograph as
required reading would help "bring it together,"
and establish a solid basis for interesting class
discussions.
C L A. BEs m
University of Akron
CAiTA5 PuNISE ENT. By James A. McCafferIy,
Editor. Chicago, Illinois: Aldine-Atherton, Inc.,
1972. Pp. 273. $7.95.
In June, 1972, opponents of the death penalty
hailed the decision of the Supreme Court which
declared capital punishment to be unconstitutional.
The decision mirrored in law what was fast becoming a thing of the past in practice. Since that decision, proponents of the death penalty have gathered new momentum; and, at present, nineteen
states have revived the death penalty, and many
more have it under consideration.
With this strong resurgence of interest in restoring the death penalty to both statutes and practice,
the release of another volume on capital punishment was viewed with some caution in the hope
that new information would be forthcoming to
supplement the already existing scholarly articles
and research which attack the death penalty as
inconsistent with human dignity in advanced
societies. McCafferty's book in this regard will be
disappointing to many, for it provides few insights
that are new to the student of the death penalty,
although its easily readable style should be appealing to the general public who are largely uninformed about the inconsistent application of the
death penalty throughout the history of mankind.
Most of the articles contained in the volume have
already been published elsewhere. Most take a
philosophical or humanitarian approach to argue
the pros and cons of the death penalty rather than
a scientific stance to prove their arguments.

Structurally, the book is divided into five sections. The last section is the most useful since it
provides the reader with basic facts on how the
death penalty discriminates against the poor and
blacks, and also because it presents a good analysis
of the eighth amendment which prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment and argues that the Supreme
Court has failed to apply the amendment to punishment of criminals.
Overall, few of the articles address themselves to
the most important issue affecting capital punishment-that is, a criminal justice system that
wantonly fails to deter criminal behavior and one
that is largely unsuccessful in rehabilitating those
who come under its custody or protection. Further,
the death'penalty must be viewed in terms of the
philosophic base of criminal law and the view of
society toward violence in general. An understanding of these issues is essential to explain why the
death penalty still exists today.
ALBERT P. CARDARELUi
Boston University
SCIENTIFiC EVIDENCE iN CnmuNAL CASES.

By

Andre A. Moensens, Ray Edward Moses and
Fred E. Inbau. Mineola, New York: Foundation
Press, Inc., 1973. Pp. xxxix, 604, $15.00.
In my last seven trials the outcome has rested
in a large degree upon my ability to cope with
scientific evidence and the explanatory testimony
of the expert witness. As most criminal trial
lawyers are beginning to know, scientific evidence
and expert testimony are becoming indispensable
in the investigation and trial of many criminal
cases. As the investigatory agencies become more
sophisticated in the detection of crimes and criminals, so must the trial attorney become better
prepared to present and rebut such evidence.
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases presents a
concise overview of the subject, giving the practitioner a basic understanding of many scientific
areas. Further, each chapter is followed by a list
of additional references providing the practitioner
with a starting place for answering his specific
questions. The book also provides an excellent text
book for the students studying criminal law.
The book contains sixteen chapters and appears
to be arranged in a logical manner. The two table
of contents, one a summary, the other, detailed,
do provide the practicing lawyer an easy starting
place to find the area of interest. Each chapter
follows a definite form. First, the specific scientific
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field is identified as to definition and theory. Then
the specific uses of the particular field are described.
A brief description of how the particular field has
been treated by the courts (with numerous citations) is next presented. The chapter is then
completed with a section on trial aids, followed by
the bibliography mentioned above.
The first chapter ("Expert Witnesses") contains
particularly useful sections oa advice to be given
to the expert witness before testifying and sample
hypothetical and impeachment questions. The
second chapter ("Discovery") is a brief summary
of the laws of disclosure. Although the contents
of this chapter should already be known by the
practitioner, particular notice should be made of
the sample motion for discovery. Chapter Three
("Psychiatry, Psychology and Neurology") is a
very basic explanation of the field of mental disorders. The first section of the chapter contains a
glossary of common terms which is helpful, but
the bibliography section is the most important
section because of the lack of depth in the chapter.
The fourth chapter ("Firearms, Evidence and
Comparative Micrography") also begins with a
glossary section. The subject matter of this chapter
lends itself to a more detailed description of the
field, and the explanation of how and why bullets
and weapons can be compared and identified is
instructive to the novice as well as the experimental lawyer.
Chapter Five ("Forensic Pathology") describes
matters that can be determined by the pathologist
(cause of death, proof of rape) and includes descriptions of several causes of death (asphyxia,
wounds, poison, etc.). The photographs in this
section are quite vivid and detailed, preparing the
young attorney for the more gruesome ones he will
probably encounter later in his practice. Chapter
Six ("Toxicology, Chemistry, Serology") provides
information in areas not much used by defense
counsel. The chapter relates information about
chemical intoxication tests, investigation of biological matters and the analysis of various drugs.
I found the most interesting section to be on the
subject of blood because of "surprises" in two
recent cases where the prosecution admitted
minute traces of blood of an unknown source which
drastically damaged the defenses. The section
describes the nature of blood, the limits of blood
analysis and the identification methods used. The
seventh chapter ("Fingerprint Identification")
covers one of the most used areas of scientific
evidence in criminal cases. After defining the terms
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used in the area, a description of the physiology
of fingerprints is made. A brief description of
fingerprint classification closes the descriptive
section of the chapter. The authors do remind the
attorney that, while there is little chance for
opposing experts to disagree, proper cross-examination can result in the undermining of the prosecution's case because of improper procedures.
Chapter Eight ("Microanalysis") concerns the
comparison and identification of hair, fibers, paint,
glass, soil, dust and wood (trace evidence) by
microscopy. The next chapter ("Neutron Activation Analysis-NAA") probably describes the
most important area of scientific evidence for the
future. Neutron activation analysis is a nuclear
method of quantitatively and qualitatively analyzing samples for the elements they contain. The
method is described as bombarding a substance
with an intense stream of nuclear particles. The
bombardment produces radioactive species of
almost all of the elements that are present. When
the radioactive particles decay, emissions can be
analyzed and compared, resulting in identification
of the substance. Approximately seventy-five
elements in concentrations as low as one-ten
millionth of a microgram can be identified. This
method can indicate the recent firing of a gun,
specific identification of paint and soil samples and
can estimate the firing distance in shooting cases.
Chapter Ten ("Questioned Documents") briefly
describes handwriting and typewriting comparisons, discovery of alterations, and ink and paper
comparisons. The chapter also recognizes that the
qualifications of the expert are most important in
this area. The eleventh chapter ('Photography,
Motion Pictures and Videotape") covers the most
potent tools-for conveying facts to a jury-the
photographs. Photo-micrography and microphotography are both described, as well as the basic
principles of photography.
Chapter Twelve ("Spectrographic Voice Identification") and Fourteen ("Polygraph Technique")
both also describe scientific fields of the future.
The sound spectrograph is an electromagnetic
instrument which produces a graphic display of
speech in the parameters of time, frequency and
intensity. The apparent major road block in this
science is the fact that the premise of voice uniqueness is still unproven.
Most attorneys are familiar with the Polygraph
and its inadmissibility in the courts. However,
since many cases are decided by the non-court use
of the Polygraph, the area is important. Chapter
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Fourteen describes how the polygraph measures
certain body functions for interpretation by the
expert, wherein the legal problems begin to attach.
Closely connected to two previous areas is the
subject matter of Chapter Fifteen ('Narcoanalysis
and Hypnosis"). Narcoanalysis is the interrogation
of an individual under the influence of a drug. In a
recent Texas case, (Cain v. State, C-73-7244-L,
Criminal District Court Number Three, Dallas,
Texas, presently pending in the appeal process),
the defense sought to use narcoanalysis as part of a
psychiatrist's testimony in a murder case. The
appellate determination of the case could provide
new light on the admissibility of this type of
evidence. It should be noted that one area not
covered by this book is the new field of lie detection
by voice-analysis, which apparently combines
spectrography with lie detector techniques.
Chapter Thirteen ("Scientific Detection of
Speeding") defines and describes the techniques
of speed detection by radar and vascar (visual
average speed computer and record). Chapter
Sixteen ("Miscellaneous Techniques") describes
the use of forensic odontology (dental comparisons), casts, models, maps, diagrams, drawings
and public opinion polls.
The opportunity to review Scientific Evidence in
Criminal Cases came at a rather opportune time
for me since I am currently involved in a circumstantial evidence murder case which will involve
forensic pathology, firearms identification, blood
analysis and probably neutron activation analysis.
All of the above subjects and more are covered by
Professors Moenssens, Moses and Inbau, and their
combined research has saved many hours of research by me and my staff. The book is a good
summary of the whole field of scientific evidence
and shall have a prominent place in my library.
CHAnis W. TEss=R
President, National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers
DELiNQU NTs
T~oRus AND THISTLES: JtuvEN
IN =Hs UNETED STATES, 1825-1940. By Robert
M. Mennel. Hanover: The University Press of
New England, 1973. Pp. xvi, 231. $10.00.
Mennel notes at the beginning of his account
that until the Nineteenth Century, control of
juvenile misbehavior rested almost exclusively
with the family. It was the coalescence of a number of major social trends-the industrial revolution, urban migration, a diminishing apprenticeship system and general large-scale unemploy-

ment-combined with the gradual abolition of
brutal secondary punishments as the result of the
penal reform movement of the Eighteenth Century,
which shifted the focus of "child saving" to more
bureaucratic institutions.
The first of such institutions was the house of
refuge. Strongly influenced by Protestant reformism, the middle-class supporters of this form
of child care still demonstrated an element of selfinterest in that the house of refuge might aid in
the control of pauperism by striking at the source
of the next generation of the poor. Needless to say,
such measures fell considerably short of their goal,
and the real conditions responsible for juvenile
delinquency steadily grew worse.
The prevention agencies and reform schools
which succeeded the houses of refuge shifted their
ideological stance from viewing the problem of the
delinquent as innate, to one arising out bf social
and economic circumstances. Nonetheless, the
same self-interest saw the "unfortunate poor" as
potentially the "dangerous classes." To avoid this
unhappy result, children exposed to such circumstances were often "placed out," that is,
plucked from their native urban environment and
sent to live with some rural family in the mid-west.
Not only was this prompted by the "agrarian
myth"--that mere exposure to cows and corncobs
is a sufficient antidote to the evils of city life-but
also such "placing out" rid the city of troublesome
unemployables.
After the Civil War, contract labor was introduced to the reform schools to lessen the costs of
their operation, but the wholesale exploitation
which resulted caused the establishment of state
charity boards to inspect juvenile institutions.
Through such an inspectorate, not only was
greater public control exercised over private
juvenile homes, but increasingly, as private institutions fell short of the mark, public institutions
were established. It also was recognized that the
judiciary should play an increased role in juvenile
care; and, in Illinois, the agitation of such reformers
as Attgeld, Lathrop, and Frederick Wines, supported by the Chicagobar, resulted in the country's
first juvenile court in Chicago in 1899.
During the early years of the Twentieth Century, the broad powers of the juvenile court and
the interest of the growing profession of social work
in juvenile delinquency combined to make such
courts centers for child study. The emphasis, however, was initially on social etiology until later in
the century when the work of several psy-
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sights which seem to have been overlooked by
previous observers. However, as Ianni himself is
aware, his study involves only one crime family
and is therefore bridled with certain limitations.
Nevertheless, his findings are extremely useful in
that they suggest many leads for future research.
Perhaps the most important contribution of the
book is it points out that much of the thinking
about organized crime is surrounded by myth. One
reason for this, says Ianni, is because much of the
information about organized crime is disseminated
by law enforcement agencies or by social scientists
drawing from the information contained within law
enforcement files. Since the law enforcement
agencies "themselves are party to the controversy," several difficulties arise concerning the
validity of their information. Furthermore, popular
culture and the mass media have long assumed that
organized crime is dominated exclusively by the
Italians or some type of conspiracy which involves
Italians. As Professor Ianai demonstrates, there is
no definite evidence that this is or is not true. If it is
true, then the Mafia or Cosa Nostra would at least
have to be an American version of the old Sicilian
form lest we assume that the Italians were totally
unaffected by the influence of American culture.
A FAw&nY BusTNLss: KiNsmp AND SocIAL CON- Therefore, the analogy of the Italian-American
TROL IN ORGANIZED CRImE. By Francis A. J. crime syndicates as a duplicate of the Sicilian
Ianni with Elizabeth Reuss-lanni. New York: Mafia is not totally correct. In addition, even in
Russell Sage Foundation, 1972. Pp. xiv, 199. Sicily and the provinces of Southern Italy, there is
no one Mafia, but rather, there are several varia$8.50.
"There is a nationwide crime syndicate known as tions of the Mafia and other secret societies. Hence,
the Mafia whose leaders are usually found in con- attempts to relate the Mafia to a single nationwide
trol of the most lucrative rackets in their cities." or international conspiracy or organization are
This was one of the concluding statements made by likely to be misguided.
Senator Estes Kefauver's Senate Crime Committee
A second major notion which has dominated the
in 1951. In his book, A Family Business, Professor thinking on organized crime, says Ianni, is that the
Ianni attempts to dispell the Kefauver statement crime syndicates have been likened to large scale,
as myth as well as point out that most of the formal or bureaucratic organizations. This notion
thinking about the Mafia is clouded by miscon- goes hand in hand with the above notion, that is, if
ceptions, overgeneralization and improper anal- the Mafia is a nationwide organization or conogies. The source of Professor Ianni's data is spiracy, then it would seem plausible that there
provided by a participant observation study of a must be present a high degree of organization with
New York based Italian-American crime family to highly formalized operating procedures and norms
which Ianni gives the pseudonym "Lupollo." geared to the pursuit of specific goals. In his study
The book is a detailed result of two-and-one-half- of the Lupollo family, Professor lanni found just
years of study during which time the author at- the opposite. His findings indicate that the Italiantended social gatherings, weddings, parties, din- American crime families cannot be based on
ners and other social events which the Lupollo structuralist concepts of bureaucracy or large-scale
family conducted. Hence, Professor Ianni not only organization. Rather, the main organizational
provides us with one of the most authoritative and base is rooted in notions of kinship and family and
extensive accounts of the Italian-American Mafia based on traditional social relationships of the
to date, but he also contributes several new in- South Italian culture. Therefore, it is not organizachologists-notably William Healy-added a more
clinical orientation.
Such, in broad outline, is the historical account
given by Mennel of institutional juvenile care, and
here, in the main, he does a creditable job. The
text reads well and is well-documented. But the
author also attempts to deal with the history of
theories of criminal etiology, and this he would
have been better advised not to do, or at least not
to do it in the same book, for he fares considerably
less well. His discussion of theory is superficial and
largely uninformed, and he does not succeed in the
admittedly difficult task he sets for himself, namely
to show the historical relationships between
etiological theories and correctional practices.
Because of this, the book seems an unbalanced
effort. What might have been a solid contribution
to the empirical history of corrections is somewhat
marred by an unsuccessful attempt at the history
of ideas. However, the material on juvenile treatment schemes is independently worthwhile, and
perhaps the book should be judged primarily on
this.
SAwYER F. SYLVESTER, JR.
Bates College
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tional norms that control behavior, but loyalty and
commitment to one's family. Authority and power
are not meted out according to universalistic
criteria or in line with a bureaucratic hierarchy, but
rather, are functions of family lineage, generational affiliation, age, and relative position in the
kinship structure. People rather than organizational functions define the organization. Personal
qualities and contacts are all important. Executive
members in the business are chosen almost strictly
from kinship criteria. The central family usually occupies the highest level of positions, with close
relatives on the second level. The second level
usually operates in a supervisory capacity over the
third level which is composed of close family
friends and over the fourth level which consists of
all the employees of the legal and illegal businesses.
It is inconceivable for supervisory or executive positions to be occupied by someone other than family.
And finally, even on the national scale, the Mafia
chieftains who were present at the Appalachian
(N.Y.) Conference in 1957 were likewise tied either
by kinship, intermarriage, friendship or by godparent affiliations (compareggio) and not because
they were related to one another through some
national organization or conspiracy. Myths such as
these then are responsible for many of the misconceptions concerning the Mafia in America.
Having dealt with these erroneous assumptions
regarding the nature of Italian-American crime
families, Professor Ianni then goes on to describe
the nature of organized crime in respect to
America's urban communities. Even though the
American model of the Mafia is not an exact replica
of its Sicilian counterpart, Ianni points out that the
conditions of the urban ghettos and slums were
quite similar to the conditions in Sicily and
Southern Italy, and thus provided fertile soil where
a Mafia-like organization could flourish. In nineteenth century Sicily, wretched social and eco-

nomic conditions, absentee landlordism, a fragmented political system and an overburdened and
exploited peasantry necessitated the creation of
secret societies and organizations for mutual protection and survival. The Mafia, Cammorra, and
other secret societies were thus established to fight
the oppression by the rich, the state, or the police
and, in general, to provide some order in what was
essentially a state of social disorganization. In
America the conditions were much the same. Exploited by the padmiroe system, corrupt labor
officials and industrialists, the Italians were forced
to work long hours for meager wages and to live

under astonishingly crowded and unsanitary conditions. In short, as industrial laborers, the Italians
were in no better shape than they had been back in
Italy as poor peasant farmers exploited by the local
ruling class. With ghetto life thus providing the
impetus, Ianni illustrates the relative ease with
which the Mafia established itself in America.
At this point, Ianni makes an important distinction regarding the term Mafia. In Sicily the
word Mafia has two distinct meanings. One
meaning has the term denoting Mafia as an organization, while the other denotes mafia as an attitude, a set of behavioral principles, or a code of
ethics. Included in the latter is a sense of pride or
the notion of "being a man" no matter what the
circumstances. Mafia as an attitude also includes
omerta or the code of silence. It was mafia as an
attitude that the Italians brought with them, not
Mafia as an organization. The fact that mafia as an
attitude eventually developed into Mafia as an
organization results from the social and economic
conditions of the cities and the nature of laissezfaire capitalism in general which prompts minority
group involvement in illicit business enterprises.
For the most part, lack of social and cultural integration into the larger society forces the group to
find alternate means of gaining a hold in society.
For ethnic groups, as Ianni shows, crime has traditionally been the first rung on the ladder of social
mobility out of the ghetto and thus of eventual
assimilation into American society. The Irish and
the Jews both used crime as a means of escaping the
ghetto and gaining a place in the larger society.
Hence, as the Italians become more acculturated
their business enterprises move from the illegitimate to the legitimate, they begin to secure more
positions in the professions, they move into nicer
residential areas, and the activities of organized
crime are thus taken over by other ethnic groups
further down the scale, in this case, the Blacks and
Puerto Ricans. Thus, the tendency is toward
greater legitimization of activities.
Since the trend is toward more and more legitimization, Ianni claims that the traditional bases
of authority and power in the family come under
fire. Younger, more highly educated members of
the family gain more power and influence and often
occupy high positions outside the family business.
The result of this split is a weakening of the traditional family values which the old "Moustache
Petes" brought with them from Italy. It is ironical
to note that the implementation of these old values
is exactly what is now allowing the split to occur,
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for it was the old mafiosos, using the cultural values
of Southern Italy as guides, who amassed the resources which allowed their descendants to move
out of the slums and eventually destroy the same
values which allowed the process to occur. Ianni
thus postulates the end result is that "the outlook
for the Italian crime families is not promising,"
(p. 194) and "an era of Italian crime seems to be
passing in large measure because of the changing
nature of the Italian community which resides in
American culture and its inclusion in the society."
(P. 194) Even though the Italians seem to be following the patterns of ethnic groups before them
by moving into the legitimate areas of society, such
popular novels and movies as The God Father, The
Valachi Papersand The Brotherhood still stress the
notion of organized crime as being synonymous
with Italians or the Italian Coso Nostra. As Ianni
illustrates, this notion is substantially misguided.
At any rate, it is probably safe to assume that the
day when people fail to recognize organized crime
as a product of Italy and Italians is a long way off.
Perhaps such works as Ianni's A Family Business
will hasten the coming of that day.
STEVEN L. DEL SESTO
University of Southwestern Louisiana
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PoIcE, Cmnni AND SOCrETY. Edited by
Clarence H. Patrick. Springfield, Illinois: Charles
C. Thomas, 1972. Pp. xii, 308. $11.50.
It is always tempting to argue with the selection
of pieces for a book of readings. Each of us would
select differently and it is no wonder that there is a
proliferation of readers as each teacher seeks to
publish a work which fills his own needs. Therefore,
it is only fair that we discuss this book of readings
in the context of the goals established by the author
for himself:

This book is designed to give an overview of the
problem of crime and the role which the policeman
plays in dealing with crimeand otherproblems....
It is also hoped that this work will serve as a useful
handbook or text for policemen in either in-service
or recruit training programs. It should also prove
helpful to students of criminology who want a brief
introduction to the crime problem and the role of
the police in our society. (ix)
Actually, the book is broader in scope than the
title implies. Part I deals with social control, the
role of the police in modem society, the police and
the constitution and the role of the patrolman. A
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relatively shorter second section deals with some
problems of a society with a heterogeneous population, notably the significance of minorities in
America and Allport's "The Nature of Prejudice."
Fully half of the book is given over to a third and
final section called "Crime and Disorder and Their
Treatment." Again the readings are broader than
the title would imply. Pieces are offered discussing
theories of crime causation, crime in America, the
disposition of offenders and some discussion of
theories of punishment, incarceration, parole and
juvenile treatment.
The symmetry of the book and comprehensiveness of the treatment of the criminal justice system
and crime might have been improved if the
twenty-nine pages on "The Police in England and
Wales" in the first section had been replaced with a
reading on the role of police intervention in interpersonal disputes and if the thirty-four pages in
section three given over to alcohol and narcotics
offenses had been used to expound on the role of the
courts in the criminal justice system. In the first
case the discussion of England and Wales would
have been more fruitful if direct comparisons with
the United States would have been made in the text
rather than left for questions for discussion at the
end. In the second case it is not clear why alcohol,
drunkenness and narcotics should be selected from
among all crimes for special treatment. However,
these are normative observations relating to my
own biases rather than an evaluation of the book
according to the author's own criteria.
Useful readings by recognized authorities are
used throughout and where required the author
has provided original pieces to bridge gaps in the
logical picture he wants to paint. Questions for
discussion and suggested readings are provided at
the end of each piece. Because of its openminded
approach to the definition of the appropriate role
of the police in a democratic society I believe that
the book may well meet the author's goal of
providing an overview of the problem of crime for
the officer in recruit training or in-service training
programs. However, where training programs run
thirteen to twenty-six weeks in duration the
student would probably be better served by being
led to the original sources cited for a more comprehensive treatment of these complex issues. This
would especially be true for students in
criminology in institutions of higher education.
laRvEY A. Juxis
Northwestern University

